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Does Death Render Life Absurd? 
 
 
In his well-known essay The Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus asserts that life, as we know it, is 
absurd. He also provides several reasons for thinking this is so – or rather several examples of 
absurdities within our lives – the most obvious of which, he suggests, is the fact that we are 
mortal (1942, p.58). Is there genuinely something absurd about mortal life because it is 
mortal, however? Does the fact that we die truly render our existences absurd on the whole? 
 In section 1, I will attempt to provide a general characterisation of absurdity. Next, in 
section 2, I will consider four aspects of mortality which might be seen as absurd from certain 
standpoints. Nevertheless, in section 3, I will outline the availability of alternative, equally 
legitimate standpoints from which these features of mortality would not appear absurd. 
Finally, in section 4, I will move on to discuss a further sort of mortality-related absurdity which 
might not be so easily dismissed (the fact that, allegedly, we live as if we do not really believe 
we will die), and demonstrate how, despite some objections, we can eliminate this absurdity 
by developing a more authentic attitude towards our deaths. In short, I will conclude that 
whether any particular thing counts as absurd is something which can only be stated relative 
to particular perspectives, but that there are coherent perspectives reasonably available to us 
for which it would not be the case that death necessarily renders life absurd. 
 
1. What is absurdity? 
 
Joel Feinberg (1992) likens a ‘paradigmatic’ kind of absurdity to the irrational, such that if 
someone believed or acted in a way that was irrational they would be doing something absurd. 
Indeed, this is close to how the term is intended in philosophical arguments, where some 
claim is labelled as ‘absurd’ if it conflicts with other accepted assumptions and thus, Feinberg 
notes, it would be irrational to adopt it (p.155). Nevertheless, Feinberg adds that mere 
irrationality may not capture the strength of what is intended by the term 'absurd'. For 
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instance, I might hold two beliefs which are incompatible with each other, but if these beliefs 
are inconsequential, or the incompatibility can only be realised through very careful 
consideration, then despite my belief in both of them being irrational, we might not rush to 
call it absurd (at least outside the philosophy classroom). 
Granting this, Feinberg argues that “The absurd is what is palpably untrue or 
unreasonable, outlandishly and preposterously so” (p.156). In other words, for absurdity to 
be present, it is not enough for us to merely believe or do something irrational, it must be that 
this irrationality was 'extreme' in some way, “whether that be the apparently knowing 
assertion of manifestly false propositions, or the apparently voluntary making of manifestly 
unreasonable decisions” (p.156). On such grounds, someone in the present day believing in 
string theory might not be absurd, even if the theory turns out to be internally inconsistent, 
but believing the Earth is flat would be absurd, since it flies so starkly in the face of the 
evidence clearly before us. 
I think it makes sense to identify cases of palpable or extreme irrationality as absurd. 
Nevertheless, Nagel provides some everyday examples of apparent 'absurdity' which needn’t 
involve any actual irrationality. For instance: 
 
“someone gives a complicated speech in support of a motion that has already 
been passed; a notorious criminal is made president of a major philanthropic 
foundation; you declare your love over the telephone to a recorded 
announcement; as you are being knighted, your pants fall down.” (Nagel, 1971, 
p.718) 
 
In each case here, the actions would perhaps be irrational if they were done deliberately, but 
assuming they are the results of accidents or ignorance, no one appears to have actually done 
or believed anything irrationally. What makes these examples absurd then? One suggestion 
could be that there is something humorous about each of these cases. However, Nagel gives 
an alternative account of what unites these instances of absurdity, claiming that “a situation 
is absurd when it includes a conspicuous discrepancy between pretension or aspiration and 
reality” (p.718). In other words, where we want or expect one thing to be true or to happen, 
but something drastically different happens, then that turn of events was, in some way, 
absurd. For instance, in Nagel’s final example, there is clearly a drastic discrepancy between 
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our pretensions and reality; specifically, our pretension that a knighting ceremony be 
dignified, and the undignified way this particular ceremony turned out.1 
The concept of absurdity as discrepancy between expectations or aspirations and 
reality also evokes another famous discussion of the absurd found in Albert Camus' The Myth 
of Sisyphus. Here Camus describes absurdity as “that divorce between the mind that desires 
and the world that disappoints” (1942a, p.50) and elsewhere writes, “The absurd is born of 
this confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world” 
(p.31-32). In other words, for Camus, our existence is absurd because, in general, reality 
cannot possibly live up to the expectations and desires we have for our lives.2 The discrepancy 
at the heart of this alleged absurdity is thus the discrepancy between our deepest aspirations 
and our actual circumstances. For example, Camus notes that, “If I were a tree among trees, 
a cat among animals, this world would have a meaning or rather this problem would not arise, 
for I should belong to this world” (p.51). The implication is that our typical human desires are 
somehow unnatural and do not fit the real confines of our existence, and that is what is so 
absurd. 
I think this characterisation of absurdity takes us in the right direction. Additionally, it 
might in fact subsume Feinberg’s initial characterisation of absurdity as irrationality since, in 
cases of genuinely absurd irrationality, there will always be some discrepancy present: e.g. 
between the individual’s beliefs and their actions, or between two of their beliefs that conflict. 
Moreover, Feinberg himself provides a further condition for absurdity which is very similar to 
Nagel’s proposal. Specifically, he notes that where there is absurdity, there are always “two 
things clashing or in disharmony, distinguishable entities that conflict with one another” 
(1992, p.156). 
Nevertheless, whereas Nagel’s account focuses on just two groups of things which can 
be in disharmony (our attitudes and reality), Feinberg’s suggestion here is broader: that 
absurdity could theoretically be present in disharmonies or clashes between any two things. 
Is Feinberg right to suggest this, however? I think he could be, and an illustration might help. 
Imagine walking down a street of small, humble cottages and then spotting a vast 100-room 
                                                             
1 The fact that many instances of absurdity are also humorous could thus be a potential consequence of their 
underlying discrepancy/disharmony, rather than a constitutive feature of absurdity itself. Indeed, many 
philosophers argue that some kind of incongruity or unexpectedness is at the root of all humorous situations 
(Morreall, 2016). 
2 Especially important, for Camus, is our expectation that life have meaning. 
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palace sitting amongst them. If there is something absurd about this situation, that implies 
that our account of absurdity should perhaps be maximally broad, as Feinberg suggests, given 
this case does not directly include any human attitudes or efforts; the discrepancy the alleged 
absurdity arises from here is merely between the sizes and styles of physical objects. 
That acknowledged and accepted, there does not appear to be any absurdity present 
in the vast size discrepancy between Mars and Jupiter. Clearly not every case of discrepancy 
in the universe counts as absurd then. But what makes one of these situations (arguably) 
absurd and not the other? Even if absurdity can potentially be present in disharmonies 
between any two things, what decides which instances of disharmony in nature count as 
absurd and which don’t? I believe the answer has something to do with our own expectations 
or attitudes as the observers of these situations. Specifically, some scenario will appear absurd 
to us when: 
 
I. we perceive it as involving some extreme discrepancy or disharmony, and 
II. that disharmony strikes us as unexpected and/or unacceptable in some way.3 
 
Thus, we judge the palace scenario to be absurd because the discrepancy it involves violates 
our own preconceptions about the typical homogeneity of neighbourhoods, whereas we have 
no such preconceptions about the sizes of planets and so do not judge that discrepancy to be 
absurd. Similarly, I might find it absurd to see a zebra walking down the street outside my 
house because I find the existence of this disharmonious event (zebras are not usually found 
in the United Kingdom) completely unexpected. Yet, if I had wearily predicted this turn of 
events (say, because I lived next door to a zoo and knew the zebra-keeper had a habit of 
leaving the enclosure’s door wide open) it might strike me as more annoying than absurd. 
 We are most likely to find a disharmonious event absurd because of its 
unexpectedness when first discovering or learning about that event. However, in cases where 
                                                             
3 There are two broad ways I think something can strike us as unexpected. First, some event can be unexpected 
if it simply falls outside of our expectations (i.e. we had no prior expectations regarding it). Second, some event 
can be unexpected if it actively clashes with our expectations (i.e. we possessed the expectation that it would 
not happen). Something is unacceptable for us, on the other hand, when we expect or believe it in a sense, but 
find we simply cannot manage to come to terms with it on a deeper, more intuitive level (and this can be for a 
variety of intellectual or emotional reasons). In either case, something’s unexpectedness or unacceptedness for 
us can both be constituted by our not yet having properly fitted it into our underlying, intuitive mental 
frameworks of meaning and expected relations. (See Proulx and Heine (2006, p.310) for further discussion of 
the kind of mental framework I’m talking about.) 
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we either do expect some disharmonious event, or the event happened in the past, we can 
still find it absurd because we have been unable to accept the reality of this event in some 
sense. For instance, imagine we knew a person’s pants would fall down at their knighting 
ceremony because we knew they refused to wear a belt and had been losing their pants all 
day. In such a case, we could certainly expect the disharmonious event in the sense of 
predicting it, but might perceive it as absurd anyway because we have still been unable to 
come to terms with the fact that it can and will really happen, for instance, because we hold 
the attitude that that people should not knowingly allow themselves to be humiliated, or that 
knighting ceremonies just have to be dignified (even if we knew, on another level, this one 
probably wouldn’t be).4 
However, different individuals can have different preconceptions and attitudes, and so 
it seems to follow that a particular discrepancy could appear unexpected or unacceptable to 
one person but not to another because of differences in their psychological makeup. Thus, 
two individuals could have completely opposing opinions on whether or not some scenario 
was absurd. For instance, whether the concept of polygamy strikes one as absurd will likely 
depend on the culture one is raised in. Moreover, we cannot say who would be correct in such 
a disagreement since it appears impossible for there to be any overriding, authoritative 
perspective on the matter. If my above proposal is accurate, then we are capable of perceiving 
things as absurd only because we are limited in our knowledge of the world and possess 
certain personal or cultural attitudes, and hence we are capable of finding certain scenarios 
to be unexpected or unacceptable. Yet, if we were to try to examine things from a fully-
informed, impersonal, and objective perspective (which would normally be authoritative in 
other disagreements), (a) we would already know everything about everything and hence 
nothing which happens could possibly strike us as unexpected, and (b) we would have no 
emotional or intellectual issues of the sort that could prevent us from fully accepting some 
fact once we learn about it. Thus, we would be aware, as a neutral fact of social science, that 
it is normal for men to have multiple wives in some cultures, and that would be that. Hence, 
                                                             
4 It is also worth noting that sometimes the unexpected/unacceptable disharmony which we see absurdity 
arising from can be the disharmony between our own violated expectations/attitudes and reality itself (e.g. this 
may be true in Camus’ account of the absurdity of life). Indeed, there will always be some degree of disharmony 
between reality and our expectations/attitudes whenever we perceive an absurdity, by definition. Nevertheless, 
since this disharmony is not always the relevant one – i.e. the disharmony we actually see as absurd – it is still 
useful to keep condition I distinct from condition II. 
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nothing could ever count as absurd for such a standpoint (indeed, the concept might even 
cease to make sense).5 
Granting this, it appears as though there can be no objective truth about whether or 
not any scenario counts as absurd. Rather, whether something counts as absurd will ultimately 
be relative to the particular perspectives it is examined from on the basis of the expectations 
or attitudes of those perspectives. It may be tempting for a person to say, ‘I know I perceive 
this event as absurd, but is it really absurd?’ However, this question is suspect. If it simply 
means, ‘Are the facts of this event, which lead me to perceive it as absurd, really as I 
understand them?’ then it is legitimate. Specifically, if a person has not properly grasped the 
basic facts of the scenario they are evaluating, we might say that their judgment of its 
absurdity does not apply to the actual scenario, and hence the actual scenario may not ‘really’ 
be absurd (even for them) because it is not really as they see it. Nevertheless, if the question 
means, ‘Granting my understanding of this scenario is accurate, am I right to see it as absurd?’ 
then the question is illegitimate and has no answer. It appears absurd to that person and that 
is all that can be said on the matter. Thus, whether or not some aspect of our lives counts as 
absurd or not can only be stated relative to particular perspectives on those lives.6 
To reiterate, I see evaluations of absurdity being made in the following way: a person, 
with their own imperfect knowledge of the world and their own set of attitudes/expectations, 
comes across some situation X. After learning about X, they perceive it as involving some 
drastic discrepancy or disharmony, and the presence of that disharmony strikes them as 
                                                             
5 Admittedly such a standpoint would be able to grant that certain events are such as to appear absurd to certain 
human perspectives, given these perspectives incorporate attitudes and expectations which are at risk of 
violation. However, the maximally objective standpoint I’m talking about here will be totally detached from 
those sort of human concerns (otherwise it would not be fully objective) and so it would be unable to ‘tap into’ 
those attitudes or expectations nor feel this absurdity itself. Thus, there can be no such thing as ‘objective’ 
absurdity, only the objective recognition that some situations are such as to be found absurd by particular 
individuals or groups. 
6 It may also be tempting to say ‘I perceived X as absurd but, had I been more informed prior to discovering it, I 
would not have. Therefore, X is not truly absurd.’ But again, this would be the wrong way to think about things. 
It would be like saying ‘I found my surprise birthday party surprising but, had I been more informed beforehand, 
I would not have. Therefore, my party wasn’t truly surprising.’ Obviously, though, there is no fact about whether 
the party was truly surprising, only whether it was, in fact, experienced as surprising by certain individuals. 
Similarly, there is no fact about whether some disharmony is itself truly absurd. Sometimes two individuals can 
have different perceptions about whether some disharmony is absurd or not and sometimes those differences 
are caused by differing levels of background knowledge prior to encountering the disharmony, but that does not 
mean the more knowledgeable person’s judgment is more authoritative or correct. The only exception, as noted 
above, is that of a person who failed to understand the basic facts of the scenario they were evaluating, in which 
case their judgment of absurdity would apply only to the scenario as it appears in their imagination, and not to 
the scenario as it actually is. 
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unexpected or unacceptable on the basis of their prior preconceptions. They then come to 
experience X as being absurd to some degree. Furthermore, and crucially, the fact that they 
perceive X as absurd arises from the combination of X’s features and their particular 
attitudes/expectations; someone else with different attitudes/expectations might experience 
X as not-absurd, and that is as unproblematic as two people having different opinions on the 
taste of chocolate ice-cream. 
This relativity does not mean that our investigation into mortality and absurdity has to 
stop here, however; there are two questions we might still be interested in asking: 
 
1. Does death inevitably render life absurd when viewed from a ‘generic’ human 
perspective? 
2. Does death inevitably render life absurd when viewed from any coherent perspective 
one could reasonably adopt? 7 
 
To be clear, when I say ‘generic’ human perspective here, what I mean is the hypothetical 
perspective which would be held by any clear-thinking, reasonably informed member of the 
human race, abstracted from any particular culture or time-period (i.e. stripped of any 
personally or culturally idiosyncratic attitudes). I believe it would be interesting to know the 
answer to 1 primarily because this is a perspective which we all share to some extent, since it 
will be informed only by expectations/attitudes that are relatively fundamental or universally 
human. Thus, we may care whether death necessarily appears to render life absurd according 
to a ‘generic’ human perspective because, if it does, this is a judgment that most people would 
agree with were they free from their personal/cultural biases. It also stands as a kind of 
middle-ground between more eccentric or extreme perspectives, and thus could plausibly 
serve to settle some differences of opinion. I mentioned earlier that there could be no 
‘objective’ evaluation of something’s absurdity and this suggestion is meant to partly address 
that gap; the ‘generic’ human perspective I have described is about as impersonal and close 
                                                             
7 When I say a perspective is ‘coherent’ I mean it must be free from internal contradictions and also present the 
actual facts of our existence adequately realistically. When I say some perspective is ‘reasonably’ available to us 
I mean either that the perspective as a whole is one which most human beings are actually capable of adopting 
and living by while continuing to lead a normal, flourishing life, or else that the specific attitudes or expectations 
of that perspective which I’m trying to highlight could be consistently incorporated into a coherent and 
reasonably available perspective. 
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to objectivity as a perspective can get while still being capable of actually perceiving 
absurdity.8 
It is worth stressing, however, that despite being an interesting perspective to focus 
on, the judgments of this generic perspective regarding something’s absurdity will not be any 
more authoritative or correct than the judgments of any other coherent perspective. Thus, if 
the answer to question 1 is yes – which I will label the ‘limited absurdity conclusion’ – that 
would still not compel us to admit that death necessarily renders life absurd period; provided 
we could point to another available and coherent perspective on our death which did not 
portray it as introducing absurdity into our existence, we could simply dismiss the claim that 
death renders life absurd as only being rationally compelling from certain standpoints which 
one needn’t adopt. To prevent this kind of move, my opponent would have to show that every 
coherent standpoint reasonably available to us portrays death as rendering life absurd – which 
I will label the ‘robust absurdity conclusion’ – and hence one cannot merely dismiss their 
charge as before. This is why, throughout this paper, I will also be trying to provide a negative 
answer to question 2. Securing this answer may be interesting and important to us because it 
will demonstrate that there are consistent and realistic worldviews we can reasonably take up 
and live by from which death would not appear to render our lives absurd. 
 Having characterised what absurdity is and the grounds upon which we judge some 
event or situation to be absurd, I can now outline what it might mean to say that we find a life 
absurd. In brief, if absurdities are extreme discrepancies which we find unexpected or 
unacceptable, then an individual’s life will presumably appear to us as absurd overall if it is 
ridden with such absurdities to some sufficient degree. For instance, if a life is filled with 
efforts which are drastically misaligned with goals or circumstances, inconsistent or 
                                                             
8 Some readers may doubt that it makes sense to speak of such a ‘generic’ human perspective. However, I believe 
there are a set of core attitudes and preconceptions which we could safely attribute to this maximally abstracted 
human standpoint. For instance, it would presumably have at least very basic physical and biological 
expectations about the way objects and living things function in our world (e.g. expectations about causality, 
gravity, and momentum, along with expectations that animals must eat nutritious food to gain energy, that 
sufficient injury will kill them, that they will aim to survive and procreate etc.). It would also presumably have 
certain basic expectations about how human beings typically behave (e.g. that we care for our children, that we 
cooperate and form tight social bonds, that we like pleasure and hate pain, that we act on reasons and do not 
knowingly pursue futile or trivial goals or abandon our projects for no reason etc.). I am uncertain as to precisely 
what expectations/attitudes to attribute to this perspective or how many or how fine-grained they should be. 
Nevertheless, it strikes me that there are some expectations/attitudes which are relatively fundamental 
amongst human beings, and these are enough to give the generic standpoint sufficient mental content to 
function in the role I have cast for it in this paper. 
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contradictory desires, or sincerely held beliefs which do not even come close to fitting with 
reality, we would likely find these disharmonies clash with our expectations and hence 
perceive the life as absurd in general. Alternatively, a life might plausibly seem absurd overall 
as a result of just one instance of absurdity, provided this absurdity was fundamental or 
important enough in the individual’s life. For instance, if a person’s primary purpose was to 
care for their family but, unbeknownst to them, their family were entirely undeserving, hated 
them, and mocked their devotion, then this single disharmony might be enough to render the 
life absurd as a whole.9 
 
2. Why think death renders life absurd? 
 
In light of my characterisation of absurdity, we can now address Camus’ assertion that our 
lives are absurd because we are mortal (1942, p.58). Putting this in the terms of my discussion 
above, we can understand Camus as claiming that death introduces some kind of extreme 
disharmony or disharmonies into our lives, which would be perceived as unexpected or 
unacceptable either from a generic standpoint or, more robustly, from any standpoint we 
might reasonably be able to adopt. However, what disharmonies is mortality actually 
responsible for? In this section, I will present four plausible suggestions, each increasing in 
seriousness, before moving on to assess whether they might (individually or collectively) entail 
either the limited or robust absurdity conclusions in section 3. 
 
2.1 The dignity of a human being vs. the indignity of death and decomposition 
 
If the absurd is perceived as arising from certain instances of extreme disharmony, then one 
potential case of absurdity which results from mortality might be felt in the juxtaposition 
                                                             
9 Why should I care if my life is absurd? Many of us may have a natural aversion to absurdity in itself. However, 
my suggestion, which I do not have room to develop here, is that perceiving our lives as absurd can undermine 
our sense of their meaningfulness, because we cannot find life meaningful unless it is sufficiently 
comprehensible and the more absurd something is the less comprehensible we will find it. Not all theorists 
believe there is a relationship between absurdity and meaninglessness [e.g. Metz (2013, p.6) and Brill (2007, 
p.7)], but some do [e.g. Camus (1942), Nagel (1971), and Pritchard (2010, p.1)], and many theorists acknowledge 
a relationship between meaning and comprehensibility or coherence, both in philosophy [e.g.  Landau (1997, 
p.263), Seachris (2009), O’Brien (2017), Audi (2005, p.333), Cottingham (2003, p.22), White (2009, p.425), and 
Veal (2017, p.251-2)] and in psychology [e.g. Heintzelman and King (2013, p.91), Juhl and Routledge (2013, 
p.220), Stillman and Lambert (2013, p.306), and Hicks and Routledge (2013)]. 
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between a living, conscious human being, and the senseless, rotting corpse they will become. 
A quote from Raymond Tallis highlights this point: 
 
“Disrobe... and look at yourself in the mirror. The image is of an earlier time-slice 
of the item that will be your corpse... You are exchanging glances with the past 
tense of liquefying carrion or a handful of ashes.” (Tallis, 2015, p.22) 
 
On a similar note Ernest Becker writes how man: 
 
“has an awareness of his own splendid majesty, and yet he goes back into the 
ground a few feet in order blindly and dumbly to rot and disappear forever” 
(Becker, 1973, p.26). 
 
If we compare a healthy human being to the decomposing material that will eventually lie in 
their graves, it can be hard to suppress a feeling of absurdity. The strength of this absurd 
feeling is, I think, partly motivated by the kind of disgust we feel when reflecting on disease, 
injury, and the breakdown of our biological form. It is this disgust which gives certain body-
horror movies their impact; as they depict humans being dismembered or metamorphosing 
into something alien and unnatural, we often feel a sense of revulsion and fear. The idea that 
our smoothly functioning bodies will one day succumb to this revolting eventuality, combined 
with our sense of ourselves as somehow dignified or otherwise above such an animal fate, 
certainly constitutes a fairly drastic disharmony and may well leave one with a palpable sense 
of the absurdity of death or mortal existence. 
 
2.2 The incredible skills and capacities of a living human vs. the inertness of a corpse 
 
More than this instinctual feeling of revulsion at what we will become, however, there is a 
sense of tragedy in what death causes us to lose, besides our dignity and integrity. Tallis, again, 
describes our corpses in the second person: 
 
“While you are longer and more corpulent than you were the day you came into 
the world... you are nonetheless as naked and as lacking in estate. Homeless, 
11 
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propertyless, wifeless, childless, friendless, jobless, thoughtless, breathless, 
pulseless, gazeless, and so completely sensationless as to not be able to 
experience even numbness.” (Tallis, 2015, p.24) 
 
Not only does death take from us our possessions and friends in a sense, it also steals our 
capacities in their entirety. No longer will we be able to reason, dream, or plan. Neither will 
we be able to do such basic animal things as run, or look around, or feel the heat of the sun. 
We will go from being the most advanced creatures on Earth (possibly even the universe), to 
mere lumps of matter, “a condition less than that of the lowest of the beasts, one that lacks 
even the order granted to a crystal” (Tallis, p.16). Through death, we do not just lose our basic 
human capacities though, but also the specific skills and knowledge that we had worked so 
hard through life to develop. No longer will we be able to read or write, or play the guitar, or 
hold conversations about politics – it will all be destroyed in time. This adds to the disharmony 
one might perceive here; death does not just strip us of the valuable faculties which life 
handed to us, but also the ones which we struggled so hard to make and find ourselves. 
Moreover, when we envision this clash between what we are and can be and what we will 
become, it may well shock and appall us, and even seem to be rather absurd. As Steven Cave 
puts it: 
 
“To create such a wonderful creature as a human being only to permit him or her 
to turn into dust seems indeed an extraordinary waste; a cruel cosmic joke at our 
expense.” (Cave, 2012, p.275) 
 
2.3 The seriousness of death’s impact on us vs. the triviality or arbitrariness of most deaths 
 
One last quote from Tallis expresses this third disharmony rather well: 
 
“The mismatch between the difficulty with which we are put together – the love, 
patience, and painstaking concern necessary for our flourishing – and the ease 
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Connected to the loss of capacities just discussed, we can identify another potential absurdity 
involved in death: it does not merely destroy that which is of greatest value to us, it often does 
so without any ceremony or warning; we can die at any time and through the most trivial and 
ridiculous of events. As Seana Valentine Shiffrin points out, we are always sad to lose things 
of value, but there is a ‘special kind of dismay or despair’ when we lose something important 
unnecessarily or for no good reason (2013, p.149), and this appears to happen regularly with 
death. Some people have their lives taken during battles or while trying to rescue others from 
burning buildings, but others will die choking on food or from falling while trying to put on 
their trousers. According to some statistics, approximately one person is crushed to death by 
a falling vending machine every year, and thirty by television sets. We would perhaps prefer 
to perish doing something noble or heroic, but we rarely get such a privilege; sometimes death 
comes for no good reason at all and sometimes it comes for reasons that strike us as 
preposterous.10 
This too, I think, could plausibly be perceived as an absurdity introduced into our 
existence because of our mortality: the disharmony between the nature of death as a 
permanent and irrevocable end to our lives – the total annihilation of all our future 
opportunities to carry out projects, pursue relationships, and seek out new experiences – and 
the carelessness with which the universe, and often other humans, treat those lives. 
 
2.4 The effort we expend to escape death vs. the inescapability of death 
 
Finally, we might also see the inevitability of death as adding to the potential absurdity of 
mortal life. Despite death often coming by surprise or for reasons which strike us as trivial, 
there is a relentlessness to it which makes us uneasy. We are given time on Earth to do with 
as we please, and for almost all other unwelcome eventualities there are things we can do to 
avoid or at least ameliorate them. However, as Bertrand Russell notes, “no fire, no heroism, 
no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave” (1957, 
p.56). Human beings are gifted with an incredible tool-kit of problem solving abilities but, 
despite the efforts of scientists and doctors, the problem of death seems insoluble. Despite 
having unique capacities amongst animals to protect and defend the things we care about, 
                                                             
10 Even when not preposterous, most deaths seem to come for fairly arbitrary reasons like accidents or illnesses. 
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we cannot protect the thing we care about most – eventually we will fail. Another quote from 
Russell captures the dreadful inescapability of death: 
 
“Brief and powerless is man's life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls 
pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent 
matter rolls on its relentless way; for man, condemned today to lose his dearest, 
tomorrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness” (Russell, 1957, p.61). 
  
The disharmony here is clear; we try desperately to avoid death, often spending much of our 
waking lives doing nothing other than what is essential for self-preservation – and yet death 
is unavoidable, sooner or later. Thus, there appears to be an extreme discrepancy present 
between the implicit aim of our death-avoidance project and the reality of mortal life, and a 
discrepancy which we may perceive as rather absurd. 
 
3. Do these absurdities entail either absurdity conclusion? 
 
The passages above, I believe, identify four extreme disharmonies involving death which 
someone might plausibly find unexpected/unacceptable and hence absurd.11 However, we 
might now ask whether these disharmonies are serious enough to entail either the limited or 
robust absurdity conclusions – in other words, whether someone examining human life from 
a generic perspective in light of these disharmonies would perceive it to be absurd overall, 
and whether this evaluation would be shared by any other perspective one could reasonably 
adopt. I will begin by assessing the first question. 
Do we have any way of securely rejecting the claim that the limited absurdity 
conclusion is entailed by these cases? One argumentative strategy might be to deny that the 
generic perspective would possess any attitudes/expectations of the sorts that these 
disharmonies violate (e.g. that we should retain our dignity forever, or that serious things 
should always happen for good reasons). Nevertheless, because I have not given much 
                                                             
11 Another feature of mortality often discussed in the literature is the fact that death threatens to interrupt our 
projects [see, for example, Nussbaum (1994, p.207) and Scarre (2007, p.60)], yet this does not appear to prevent 
our whole-hearted commitment to them. However, I do not believe this constitutes a disharmony of the sort we 
would normally perceive as absurd; so long as some of our projects are completable or capable of generating 
some value before death arrives, there is nothing irrational or disharmonious about our commitment to them. 
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indication as to precisely what attitudes or expectations the generic perspective would 
possess, it would be difficult to make this argument. One would perhaps have to survey a large 
cross-cultural group of people to establish whether they had these psychological traits and 
then make the claim, on that basis, that these traits would also be possessed by the generic 
human perspective, but even that would be somewhat contentious. 
 I will not attempt to go down that route. Rather, even assuming that the generic 
perspective would perceive absurdity in the above cases, I want to ask whether it necessarily 
follows that the generic perspective would also therefore perceive our lives as wholes as being 
absurd. It is true that a bizarre twist at the end of a film can be enough to render the whole 
thing seemingly absurd, for instance, if the twist undermined the core values or moral of the 
story, or rendered the protagonist’s aims incoherent. However, it is also possible to imagine a 
movie being capped off with an absurd little scene which has nothing to do with the rest of 
the piece. As such, it might detract from the quality of the film somewhat but not always to 
such a degree as to render the entire thing absurd. The question now is whether the 
absurdities I have discussed are of the first sort or the second. 
Starting at the bottom, the final disharmony I considered (our striving to avoid death 
vs. its inevitability) looks likely to be an absurdity of the first sort. The inescapability of death 
does seem to reach back into the life and its efforts in a sinister way, rendering much of the 
individual’s activities futile. Yet, we can object to my earlier description of this disharmony as 
being somewhat unfair or misleading. It is true that we spend a lot of effort trying to avoid 
death, despite death being seemingly unavoidable; nevertheless, a fairer way of characterising 
our efforts would perhaps be to describe us as striving to postpone death as long as possible, 
and that implicit aim does not appear to clash with the inevitability of death at all.12 Hence, 
in this case, there is no real disharmony for absurdity to arise from; our efforts are not absurdly 
futile in the face of death’s inescapability because we are not really trying to escape death at 
all, just hold it off. 
Moving on, the third disharmony I considered (the seriousness of death vs. the 
triviality of most causes of death) looks likely to be an absurdity of the second more innocuous 
                                                             
12 I say ‘fairer’ here because I believe were we to actually ask the majority of people what the aims of their 
actions are (e.g. going to see a doctor about an illness), they would likely not say they were trying to avoid death 
outright, but rather that they were trying to avoid this mortal threat and thereby live longer (but not infinitely 
long). It would therefore be an unfair misrepresentation of their aims to characterise them in the former way. 
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type. It is true that the generic perspective might see something absurd about the death of 
someone who slipped on a banana peel, but this absurdity is closely tied to the individual’s 
demise itself. The contents of the rest of the individual’s life – their relationships, 
achievements, projects, plans etc. – seem to escape being tarnished by this absurd event since 
it does not obviously relate back to them in any way; it is merely one absurd thing which 
happened to occur at the end of the life and so does not appear to render the life absurd 
overall. 
I am less certain that the other two disharmonies (involving the loss of our dignity and 
our capacities) can be dismissed as innocuous in this way, however. Granting that the 
absurdities here arise from the clash between the dignity and capacities of a living human and 
the foul, object-like corpse they will become, it seems that these absurdities will involve more 
or less the entire life, given it is throughout the entire life that we see ourselves as possessing 
these qualities. That acknowledged, I can think of an objection one might still make: that, 
although these absurdities do involve the entire life to a degree, they are only integrated with 
it in a light or minor way or are otherwise relatively insignificant. Consider a person with a 
ridiculously complicated name who went through life without encountering anyone who 
could pronounce it correctly. It might be that we see some absurdity in this scenario, and 
absurdity which ranges across the entire life. Yet, again, would it be enough to characterise 
the life as a whole as being ‘an absurd life’? If that were the only absurd aspect of it, I don’t 
think it would be enough. But are the absurdities involving our dignity and capacities similarly 
insignificant? Unfortunately, my intuitions are far less clear in these cases. 
To summarise, it seems indeterminate as to whether any of the disharmonies I have 
considered could entail the limited absurdity conclusion. They would entail this conclusion if 
(a) the generic perspective possesses the sorts of attitudes or expectations which clash with 
these disharmonies, and (b) the absurdities which would arise from them have the necessary 
breadth and depth as to render our entire lives absurd. Yet, the latter condition presumably 
depends on where we set some threshold for absurdity and the former on what we can 
consider to be the ‘core’ human attitudes and expectations, and I cannot presently think of 
any way to settle these issues conclusively and non-arbitrarily. 
Nevertheless, even if we conceded that the disharmonies considered were strong 
enough to secure the limited absurdity conclusion, I believe they would still not be enough to 
entail the robust absurdity conclusion. To do so, it would need to be shown that there is no 
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coherent perspective we can reasonably take up such that these disharmonies do not appear 
to be absurd (and so much so that they render mortal life itself entirely absurd). However, 
even if a generic human perspective would perceive them this way, there are clearly 
alternative and legitimate outlooks one can adopt which would present them in a much less 
troubling light. 
We can start by considering the first kind of absurdity related to death which I 
identified: the clash between our dignity, and the indignity which overcomes us after death. 
It is true that there is a particular view of death we can take, juxtaposing our current form 
with that of putrefying flesh, which makes the change seem foul and humiliating. However, 
we can also try to take up different outlooks or attitudes such that we no longer find this 
feature of mortality absurd. One option might be to think about things from a more scientific 
angle and imagine that the particles which had moved through the universe to temporarily 
constitute our bodies and lives are simply becoming unbonded from each other and returning 
to circulate through the universe as they had done previously. Since there is nothing obviously 
undignified about that, we may cease to perceive any disharmony or absurdity in this instance. 
The problem with this suggestion, however, is that it is not a ‘reasonably adoptable’ 
perspective and neither can it be incorporated into one;13 we cannot live properly flourishing 
lives from this purely scientific viewpoint because we would no longer be able to do even the 
most basic things, such as acknowledging that some groups of atoms are more important to 
us than others. Neither could we simply reserve this outlook for thinking about death alone 
while attempting to combine it with another more ordinary perspective; this would leave us 
with a fragmented, truncated, and incoherent worldview. 
What we need are new attitudes or expectations which don’t clash with the 
disharmonies above but can be integrated into coherent and reasonably adoptable 
perspectives. Luckily, I think such attitudes and expectations exist. For instance, we might 
simply try to dislodge the expectation, which many of us might have, that we can or will be 
able to retain our dignity forever. If we can truly come to terms with the idea that our dignity 
is only a temporary state, the disharmony instigated by its loss will not strike us as absurd. 
Alternatively, we could try to take up a more spiritual perspective on our deaths, reflecting on 
the actual decomposition of our bodies themselves but interpreting this as our 'returning to 
                                                             
13 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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nature' in some way. These suggestions both seem to eliminate our perceptions of absurdity 
and, crucially, do seem open to integration into a reasonably adoptable and functional 
standpoint. 
 Given these new outlooks are coherent and do not deny the fundamental facts of the 
matter, I see no reason why we should not be permitted to adopt them. Of course, other 
outlooks may be equally legitimate, and this means one would also be free to see death as 
causing an unacceptable destruction of one's integrity and dignity, and as rendering one's life 
somewhat absurd for that reason. However, death need not be seen as introducing this 
absurdity into our lives period; there are less disturbing stances reasonably available to us 
from which our eventual decomposition, though perhaps disharmonious with the integrity we 
enjoyed throughout life, is found to be reasonably expected and tolerable and hence not 
absurd. 
 I believe the same move can be made with regard to the other three kinds of death-
related disharmony noted earlier. It is possible to see a threat of absurdity in the facts that 
death destroys our impressive capacities, comes unpredictably and often for trivial reasons, 
despite its seriousness, and is unavoidable, despite our desperate striving. Yet, I believe it is 
also possible for us to manage our expectations and attitudes in such a way that we would no 
longer perceive these disharmonies as particularly strange or surprising. There are outlooks 
we could take on these aspects of death which would allow us to transform it from a cruel 
joke into something we can accept as a part of life, and as long as these outlooks involve no 
falsehoods about the nature of death and can be fit into our overall perspectives without 
rendering them incoherent or unworkable, I see no reason why this move should be 
objectionable. 
For example, we may choose to see that, although living things lose their capacities 
when they die, this is just an inevitable aspect of biological life, and does not mean our efforts 
have been wasted, provided we used our talents while alive. Thus, we may be able to cast off 
the expectation that our capacities can or should be preserved forever. Similarly, one could 
adjust one’s attitudes so that, although death often arrives for trivial reasons, this is no longer 
something that one considers appalling or surprising. The forces of chance reign in other areas 
of our lives; why expect it to be any different here? Finally, we could accept what I noted 
earlier, that throughout all of our self-preservation activity, we were not trying to avoid death 
altogether, but merely postpone the date of our deaths as long as reasonably possible. This 
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goal would avoid coming into conflict with death’s inescapability, and so the disharmony itself 
seems to evaporate. In these ways, though our situation would remain objectively the same, 
it would no longer be perceived as absurd because of our new perspective. 
In short, it is unclear whether any of these four disharmonies entail the limited 
absurdity conclusion and false that they entail the robust absurdity conclusion. Even if we 
grant that they would be perceived as absurd from a generic human standpoint and so much 
so as to make our lives appear absurd on the whole, they would still not entail the robust 
absurdity conclusion because I have demonstrated the possibility of accessible alternative 
perspectives from which these disharmonies needn’t appear absurd at all. Nevertheless, in 
the following section I will consider one final disharmony which is potentially harder to dismiss 
using any of the above strategies. In other words, if this disharmony is necessarily present in 





The final case of death-related absurdity which I will discuss arises from the assertion that, 
despite ostensibly being aware that we are mortal, human beings fail to truly believe that 
death will come for them. As Camus writes, everyone claims to know that they will die, “yet… 
everyone lives as if no one ‘knew’” (1942, p.11). Although people will acknowledge 
intellectually that they are mortal, the charge is that we typically fail to actually grasp this fact 
and all it means for us. Specifically, we can assume that most human beings are aware that 
their biological life will come to an end and the animal that they are will perish. Nevertheless, 
although they are aware of this fact, they fail to truly comprehend the inevitability of their 
own death as the final termination of their entire subjective world. The demise of our body is 
something we are prepared for, but the final and irreversible end of our subjective experiences 
is something that we do not typically anticipate and have not come to terms with. It is this 
failure to grasp the true subjective world-ending seriousness of our deaths which, according 
to Ernest Becker, “is what keeps men marching into point-blank fire in wars: at heart one 
doesn't feel that he will die, he only feels sorry for the man next to him” (1973, p.2). 
 We can see clearly how there is a potential absurdity here; there is a disharmony 
between the reality of our death and our expectations/attitudes themselves. Our death, as 
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the end of our subjective world, is inevitable, yet we think and live as though this were not 
the case. If this is true, then there is something about our situation as mortal beings which we 
may well perceive as absurd, and an absurdity which is fairly fundamental, underlying our 
entire lives and the choices we make. Thus, this absurdity is plausibly significant enough to 
render our lives absurd on the whole. After all, we are creatures whose lives are characterised 
by mortality and finitude and yet we go through life without ever truly grasping this central 
and critically important fact about ourselves.14 It is also much more difficult to imagine a 
perspective we could take up which would not perceive this disharmony to be absurd; 
although I can develop an outlook such that our eventual decomposition does not seem 
unexpected or unacceptable, the notion that we are this fundamentally deluded about our 
lives is going to be difficult to simply shrug off from any angle. 
If the above is true, then this disharmony may entail both the limited and robust 
absurdity conclusions. However, there is perhaps a way we can eliminate the possibility of 
this absurdity in our own lives and hence negate those conclusions by demonstrating that 
death does not inevitably introduce this absurdity into all mortal existences. Specifically, I 
have argued that absurdity is perceived as arising from certain kinds of extreme discrepancies 
between distinct things. For instance, in this example, it holds between an individual’s beliefs 
and the reality of their mortality. Thus, it seems that this absurdity could be avoided, in 
principle, by eliminating or altering either of the two things in conflict. Indeed, as Nagel writes, 
“When a person finds himself in an absurd situation, he will usually attempt to change it, by 
modifying his aspirations, or by removing himself from the situation entirely” (1971, p.718). 
In this case, unfortunately, the situation is our lives, and so (ignoring suicide or the 
development of an immortality serum) it will not be possible to literally remove ourselves 
from the situation itself. Nevertheless, the first option does look plausible; we could perhaps 
avoid any absurdity arising simply by altering our problematic belief such that it no longer 
comes into conflict with our reality as mortal beings. 
To introduce some new terminology, we should want to develop an authentic attitude 
towards our death, by bringing our beliefs about death in line with reality, even if that is 
cognitively challenging. Specifically, we have to live in full consciousness of the fact that we 
                                                             
14 Of course, it follows that, being unaware of this delusion, we will also fail to notice the absurdity of our 
situation. Nevertheless, I presume experiencing absurdity is not all we care about and that we would also prefer 
to avoid having a life such that, if we were to discover some truth about it, we would come to see it as absurd. 
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will die, and with an understanding of precisely what that entails: that it is inevitable, 
unavoidable, and the final and permanent limit of our potential for acting and experiencing 
and everything else. If we could develop a fully authentic attitude towards our death, then 
we may think that any absurdity would have been eliminated. If the underlying disharmony 
consists in our failure to be fully aware of our mortality, then this disharmony could be 
disarmed simply by becoming better aware of our mortality. 
Nevertheless, some might argue that this strategy is not as easily employed here as it 
might appear since the reason we currently fail to grasp our mortality is, straightforwardly, 
because it is very difficult for us to conceive of our deaths. As Nagel writes: 
 
“That's what's hard to get hold of: the internal fact that one day this consciousness 
will black out for good and subjective time will simply stop. My death as an event 
in the world is easy to think about; the end of my world is not.” (Nagel, 1986, 
p.225) 
 
Essentially, one could argue that, to imagine our own death, we would have to imagine a 
world without us in it. However, in any scene that we imagine, we will always be present at 
least to the extent that we are taking a perspective on that scene (just as we have always 
been present for every moment of the universe we have ever witnessed). It is therefore 
impossible to conceive of our own deaths at all, from a first-person view, because death 
means the elimination of our first-person view on anything. One could then argue it is 
unsurprising that most human beings fail to fully grasp the reality of their mortality, because 
it is cognitively challenging for us to imagine what our own deaths would actually involve. 
Hence, we could be stuck with what one might call an ‘inauthentic’ attitude towards our own 
deaths: the state described above wherein we purport to believe in our own mortality, but 
do not really believe it, deep down. 
I’m not convinced by the above argument, however. As Kagan (2012, p.188), points 
out, we would similarly find it impossible to imagine, first-personally, what it is like to be in a 
dreamless sleep. However, it would be bizarre to suggest on that basis that none of us can 
ever truly grasp or believe the fact that we sometimes experience periods of dreamless sleep. 
As Kagan notes (p.187) this would only follow if we adopted a theory of belief which stipulated 
that we can never truly believe something is a possibility for us without being able to imagine 
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what that thing is first-personally like. But in the absence of any compelling reason for 
adopting such a theory, and in light of the dreamless-sleep counterexample, I think we are on 
safe ground to set aside this above argument for the time being.15 
Yet, there is another reason why it might be challenging for us to employ the above 
strategy (of avoiding the absurdity of death-denial by simply ceasing to deny death), not 
because a full consciousness of our mortality is intellectually difficult to attain, but because it 
is emotionally difficult. This is the thesis at the heart of Ernest Becker’s Pulitzer Prize winning 
book The Denial of Death: “the idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal like 
nothing else” and so we are driven to try and deny or distract ourselves from thoughts of our 
mortality through any means at our disposal (1973, p.ix). Becker begins by arguing that a fear 
of death is “behind all our normal animal functioning” since it is a fear of harm and dying 
which motivates us to invest all the energy we do into self-preservation (p.16). This is the case 
for all animals, Becker notes, and is why we go to such extreme lengths to escape and avoid 
dangerous situations. Fear of death is evolutionarily selected for, in a sense, because it is 
advantageous for the survival of our genes. 
Unlike other animals, however, the problem for humans is that we are not just afraid 
of various deadly things in our environment, we are capable of conceiving of our mortality in 
the abstract. In other words, the human “is the only animal in nature who knows he will die” 
(Becker, 1971, p.141). We do not just know that death is a possibility, as animals do; we know 
that our own death is inevitable. Yet, this means the anxiety we would usually feel when faced 
by specific threats – “the constriction in the chest and throat, the pounding heart, the inner 
sinking – the feeling of imminent chaos and utter destruction, towards which the organism 
does not seem to have any resources to oppose” (p.41) – could theoretically be constantly 
present since we know, regardless of our current circumstances, that death is on its way. 
Such a feeling, if experienced constantly, would be incompatible with normal 
functioning. Living constantly under the anxiety which we feel when directly threatened by 
                                                             
15 Some may also be worried that there is a potential absurdity present here, perhaps between death’s 
inevitability and the fact that we find it impossible to conceive of our deaths first-personally. However, it’s 
unclear whether this is a serious concern. First of all, I’m not certain there is a true disharmony here, but even if 
there was, we would only perceive this disharmony as absurd if we had something like the expectation that we 
should be able to first-personally conceive of everything that happens to us. Yet, very few would find the notion 
of dreamless sleep itself to be absurd, and I take it this indicates that the vast majority of us do not share anything 
like the above expectation. Hence the feature of mortality under discussion would presumably not come out as 
absurd in either the limited or robust senses outlined earlier. 
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death would be paralysing. As Becker writes, “I believe that those who speculate that a full 
apprehension of man's condition would drive him insane are right, quite literally right” (1973, 
p.27). Thus, the only option human beings have in order to avoid paralysis and continue living, 
according to Becker, is to find ways to deny or distract ourselves from our knowledge of death, 
so that this death-anxiety can be held at bay. Specifically, Becker notes that we may do this 
through certain literal death-denying ideologies, such as religion, which promise that we are 
actually immortal, and thus relieve us of our anxiety. Or, on the other hand, we may also 
subscribe to metaphorical death-denying ideologies or cultures, which can give us a spurious 
sense of immortality, even while acknowledging the demise of our body. For instance, when 
we create seemingly enduring things like pyramids, temples, or skyscrapers, we may believe, 
on some level, that we will live on in these things after our deaths. The same might also be 
true for our families or the causes we have been a part of (p.4-5). In short, we look to our 
culture to find ways of denying and ignoring our mortality: “Culture opposes nature and 
transcends it. Culture is in its most intimate intent a heroic denial of creatureliness” (p.159). 
 The upshot of all this is that the strategy I suggested for avoiding this absurdity in our 
lives – to simply bring our beliefs, aspirations, and attitudes in line with reality – may not be 
feasible. If Becker is right, then developing what I have called an authentic attitude towards 
our own mortality would be impossible or, at the very least, it would result in our being driven 
mad and paralysed by fear, which would not be conducive to living a flourishing and successful 
life. Perhaps there is a dilemma here? Either live purposefully, striving to achieve things of 
significance, but with some measure of death-denial and hence absurdity and incoherence in 
our lives, or try to live authentically and face up to our mortality, but be left so wracked with 
anxiety that leading a normal life becomes impossible. 
The two options Becker presents appear to be either (1) deny one’s death altogether 
and believe in some illusory immortality (whether real or metaphorical), or (2) live in constant 
conscious awareness of death and thus be driven mad with fear. Nevertheless, I think that 
Becker’s conclusions are perhaps too pessimistic and so the dilemma presented above may 
be false. Whilst I would not deny that most animals seem to have an in-built fear of death, 
and that even abstract reflection on mortality can, in private hours, give way to the kind of 
paralysing fear Becker described, I believe there is a way to live without either experiencing 
crippling death-anxiety or adopting a self-deceptive and inauthentic attitude towards death 
namely: to accept that death is real, inevitable, and does indeed entail the end of our 
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subjective world, but simply to put this thought to the back of our minds. Grasping the truth 
about our mortality and refusing to deny it does not require relentless dwelling on death. 
Rather, we can develop an authentic attitude towards death, and try to come to terms with 
it, without it being at the forefront of our mind every day. 
As an analogy, consider a delicious meal at an expensive restaurant. If one reflected 
on how this carefully-prepared meal is merely the precursor for something one would later 
on flush down the toilet, that might spoil one’s appetite. But this does not mean that eating 
and enjoying a nice meal must always be an absurd event, involving inauthentic attitudes or 
self-deception. Refusing to dwell on the ultimate end of the food we are eating does not entail 
performing any denial or cowardly mental acrobatics; it simply means refusing to dwell on it. 
One can live honestly and in the truth of the world while still avoiding invasive thoughts which, 
while true, would unnecessarily spoil one's time. Sometimes the only way to enjoy our 
Sundays is to ignore the fact that Monday is around the corner but that does not mean we 
really convince ourselves that Monday will never come, it is simply a pragmatic decision to 
focus our attention on more pleasant things. Similarly, I propose that we could allow our 
attention to be taken up with the intricacies of living, most of the time, and thus avoid any 
paralysing death-anxiety, and that this would not amount to death-denial in any serious sense. 
Thus, there would be no potentially absurd discrepancy involving our thoughts or actions. We 
would not be pretending to be immortal, or lying to ourselves, we would simply be focusing 
on the parts of life which weren’t quite so upsetting.16 
Moreover, I think we can also recast Becker’s claims about our commitment to 
monuments, causes, and our family in a more positive light. On Becker’s account, our concern 
for these things was explained more or less entirely as a mere strategy for denying our 
                                                             
16 Some might argue that this suggestion still counts as denialism. Perhaps a truly authentic attitude towards 
death would require a constant consciousness of one’s approaching demise throughout everything we do. 
However, this recommendation seems impossible to achieve, not because it would be too frightening but simply 
because our minds are incapable of working that way. When we truly engage with our activities, we must focus 
on them to the expense of almost everything else. We just don’t have the brainpower to keep up a constant, 
ongoing background awareness of our mortality and live our lives. There is nothing special about death here 
though; there are many significant truths about our lives for which it would be equally impossible to keep up a 
constant awareness. Thus, it follows that, if life can be rendered absurd through our failure to remain perpetually 
conscious of death, it would also be rendered absurd through our failure to remain perpetually conscious of a 
horde of other significant truths. This view strikes me as implausible; we do not have to maintain a constant 
awareness of every important fact about our existence to avoid absurdity. More specifically, developing a 
genuine awareness of death but only checking in on it from time to time is about as much as we can manage 
and, I think, good enough to secure authenticity and avoid denialism here. 
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mortality by symbolically leaving traces of ourselves behind in more enduring things. Yet, by 
putting effort into the creation and maintenance of these things, we needn’t be doing 
anything intellectually dishonest. Perhaps when someone’s death-anxiety is reduced as a 
result of their investment in some external thing, it is not because they believe they will 
survive in that thing, but rather that they have simply redirected some of their self-interest 
away from themselves and into that thing.17 In other words, if I find myself caring about my 
family or my work, and feeling better about my death because of their existence, it needn’t 
be because I think I am present in those objects, but simply because I care about things 
besides myself, and hence death, when it comes, will not destroy everything I care about. 
Understood this way, there is nothing inauthentic about investing time and effort into external 
projects and causes. It is simply a way of divesting our self-concern into external things so that 
what we value in life is more resilient to the threat of our own death. 
In summary, despite the worry presented by Becker, I think it is entirely possible to live 
a full and flourishing life without having to perform any self-deception or death-denial. Death 
can be a fearsome thing, but by concerning ourselves with things besides our own person, 
and by refusing to dwell on it constantly, this fear can be lessened and managed. Thus, it is 
entirely possible to live on with an authentic attitude towards death, and hence avoid the 
potential absurdity that death-denial would introduce into our lives. We simply have to check 
ourselves, from time to time, to ensure we have not slipped from the more legitimate and 
authentic methods for dealing with death-anxiety into the inauthentic strategies of ignoring 




In this paper, I have examined the claim that death renders life absurd. First, I established that 
we perceive something as absurd when it involves some extreme discrepancy which we find 
unexpected or unacceptable, and argued, on that basis, that absurdity itself is a property 
which only exists relative to particular perspectives. Nevertheless, I suggested that we could 
still try to assess whether death might necessarily introduce any disharmonies into our lives 
                                                             
17 See Scheffler (2013) for further exploration of something like this idea. 
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which would be judged as absurd either by a generic human perspective or, even more 
worryingly, by any coherent perspective we are capable of taking up. 
After considering this question, it appeared there were some kinds of disharmony 
which death seems to inevitably introduce into our lives (such as the disharmony between the 
dignity of a living human and the indignity of decomposition). However, there exist consistent 
and realistic perspectives we can take on these disharmonies such that they do not appear 
absurd and, even if they are of the sort to appear absurd to a ‘generic’ human standpoint, it 
is indeterminate as to whether any of them are serious enough to make our lives appear 
entirely absurd. On the other hand, we did examine another potential death-related absurdity 
which would pose this sort of threat: the fact that we may be guilty of unconscious death-
denial in our daily lives. Nevertheless, I demonstrated that it is possible to actively eliminate 
this absurdity through developing an authentic awareness of our mortality. There may be 
other death-related disharmonies which I have not considered – indeed it would be 
impossible to prove I had discussed them all – however, at least for these most obvious 
examples, I have shown that they are insufficient to secure the robust absurdity conclusion 
(and possibly also the limited absurdity conclusion), and I can think of no others that would 
be sufficient.18 
  
                                                             
18 For their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, I would like to thank Christopher Bennett, 
Elizabeth Thomas, the attendees of the 2018 Uppsala University conference of the International Association for 
the Philosophy of Death and Dying, and my two anonymous reviewers. 
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